Excellent learning and peer-to-peer networking opportunities with a cross-section of the nuclear industry.
The world’s first certified professional development programme for individuals in nuclear security management.
An extensive archive of information on nuclear security, both from WINS and from external sources.
Helping licensees assess the maturity of their security programme and measure their security culture effectiveness.
Nuclear safety and security have common goals which are to protect people, property and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. For many years, nuclear facility managers have integrated the different elements of safety, such as radiation protection, fire and environmental safety. This has proved successful as measured by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), which conducts peer reviews for every operating nuclear power plant to assess the effectiveness of operations and safety. However, the interface with security has not achieved the same level of integration.
On one hand, the global nuclear safety regime is made up of a complex web of relationships that serve to enhance safety. The safety regime is founded on a variety of international legal instruments, including conventions and codes of conduct and safety standards provided by WANO and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), supplemented by support programmes and a global network of experts.
Nuclear security at the international level, on the other hand, is not as mature. It comprises international legal instruments, including conventions and codes of conduct and the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications, supplemented by IAEA security services and additional guidance and support from organisations such as WINS. IAEA nuclear security guidance is less comprehensive and less mature than its counterpart safety standards.
At the facility level, this disparity between the maturity of safety and security can result in friction and a lack of staff participation in security improvement initiatives. The effective implementation of an insider threat programme, for example, may be compromised if security and nuclear safety-related services do not work closely together. In addition, while staff having responsibility for nuclear safety will be familiar with the details of a severe accident for their facility, they will be less familiar with the security-focused design basis threat (DBT). Likewise, security professionals will most likely be unfamiliar with the details of a severe accident analysis. Closer integration is designed to close the knowledge gap on both sides.
The purpose of the training course was to help participants better understand the interfaces between safety and security at nuclear facilities and to learn how to optimize the relationship, using their knowledge, skills and professionalism as scientists, technicians and engineers. The key areas of knowledge covered in the training course included:
The course was designed for 40-50 participants. The participants for this training were:
The training was delivered by a diverse team of international subject matter experts and Indian experts. The course used lectures and discussions to review topics, but the primary method of learning was through the use of role play, gaming and table top exercises.