Excellent learning and peer-to-peer networking opportunities with a cross-section of the nuclear industry.
The world’s first certified professional development programme for individuals in nuclear security management.
An extensive archive of information on nuclear security, both from WINS and from external sources.
Helping licensees assess the maturity of their security programme and measure their security culture effectiveness.
Nuclear sites are spending considerable time and money on upgrading security arrangements to meet more and more stringent corporate and regulatory requirements. Increases in operational security costs at nuclear facilities have risen steadily over recent decades; estimates now suggest that the operational security budget at nuclear power facilities has increased by a factor of x4 since 9/11; what used to cost 5 million now costs 20 million.
Much of the increase can be attributed to the cost of enhanced guarding arrangements, a higher ratio of armed guards or police being deployed at nuclear facilities, and greater attention being given to cybersecurity measures.
In spite of such expenditure, however, it remains difficult to analyse security costs in order to determine whether the security choices being made are also the best investment decisions and to demonstrate whether the balance of expenditure is right. It’s a complex problem that starts with the national threat assessment, the design basis threat for the nuclear sector and the assumptions made about adversary capability and intent. It also depends on the risk appetite of the government, regulator and licensee and their assessment of the reputational and financial consequences of a successful attack on security.
We know that calculating a conventional return on investment (ROI) is challenging for nuclear security programmes because of the lack of real data, but that doesn’t lessen the need to prioritise and justify security expenditure – and to justify the balance between expenditure between security areas, such as physical protection, cybersecurity and security awareness/culture.
A lot can be learned from other business sectors, such as aviation, where the analysis of ROI and annualised loss expectancy (ALE) are required to justify whether a particular security investment is worthwhile. Although the nuclear industry operates in a different context, how organisations approach security expenditure analysis is comparable. Encouraging a wider discussion on nuclear security expenditure and reviewing security expenditure analysis originating from other sectors would support the development of financial models to help inform decision makers in the nuclear industry. Ultimately, it would lead to identifying metrics helping to ensure that security expenditure is targeted at the most effective measures and that unnecessary expenditure are reduced.
The Security Awareness Special Interest Group (SASIG) and WINS partnered together to provide senior security professionals from all sectors with an opportunity to debate these issues, share best practices and new approaches, and encourage the development of financial models to help inform decision makers in the security industry. This important joint initiative addressed such questions as:
This event was designed for a group of 50 delegates, including 25 representatives of the nuclear sector. This workshop targeted experts and leading thinkers in security matters, performance evaluations and financial matters. Attendees included: