Countering Homegrown Violent Extremism in the Nuclear Sector: Threats and Mitigation Strategies

Vienna, Austria – Wolke 19, Ares Tower
25th – 27th April 2017

Building on the successes of the 2014 Insider Threat Summit in Vienna, Austria and of the 2016 Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) International Workshop in London, United Kingdom, WINS is pleased to announce the organisation of a follow-up International Workshop on Countering Homegrown Violent Extremism in the Nuclear Sector: Threats and Mitigation Strategies to be conducted from 25 to 27 April 2017 in Vienna, Austria.

For decades, the nuclear sector has developed protection strategies with the belief that both domestic and international adversaries, acting from inside or outside the nuclear organisations, would prepare their malicious acts or perpetrate their actions under certain assumptions, following very specific goals and targeting materials and facilities to accomplish clear and logical achievements. The growth in extremism has demonstrated that these assumptions and subsequent security strategies need to be reconsidered and strengthened\(^1\).

According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), the number of conventional terrorist attacks around the world has increased markedly since 2011 (See Figure 1).

The largest ever year-on-year increase in deaths from terrorism was recorded in 2014, rising 80% from 2013 to 2014. The number of people who have died from terrorist activity has increased nine-fold since the year 2000.

In addition, lone wolf attacks by radicalised individuals are increasing in frequency. Overall, it is estimated that 100 instances of lone wolf terrorism took place in Western countries between 2006 and 2014, resulting in 164 deaths and 491 injuries. Lone-wolf terrorism encompasses a wide range of actors with differing motivations, aims and targets.

Increasingly sophisticated use of the internet, social media, and information technology by extremists and propagandists adds an additional layer of complexity, and conventional security approaches are unlikely to identify and disrupt all terrorist plots.

\(^1\) https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/changes_in_modus_operandi_of_is_in_terrorist_attacks.pdf modus operandi of the radicalised individuals
Recent events in Europe, and in particular in Belgium and France, have demonstrated that individuals with extremist ideologies have gained employment in scientific, engineering and technical positions at nuclear facilities.

In response to these events, governments and nuclear operators have significantly revised their security posture to adapt to this continuously evolving threat. In particular, human reliability programmes have been strengthened or simply established when they were not existing. Significant efforts and investments have been initiated to protect materials, facilities and staff against malicious actions through more responsive and flexible security arrangements. Programmes to address root causes of violent extremism have also been launched, in particular by providing resources to communities to build and sustain local prevention efforts and promote locally and globally the use of counter-narratives to confront violent extremist messages. Successful mitigation of HVEs and other radicalised individuals will require the development of comprehensive approaches built on stakeholder engagement and based on mutual confidence, effective communication, cooperation and coordination amongst all stakeholders.

The workshop will aim to identify the motivation, intention and capabilities of radicalised individuals and to assess the impact of this evolving threat to the current security arrangements at nuclear facilities.

The workshop will explore the role of different stakeholders involved in the identification and mitigation of HVE threats, and then provide participants with an opportunity to learn about the latest and most effective methods to assess and manage HVEs during the three stages of employment (pre-, during- and post-employment).

The workshop will conclude with the identification at facility-level of methods, tools and operational practices to mitigate the HVE threat. Key outcomes of the discussions will be consolidated in WINS guidance and training material that will be made available to all practitioners of the nuclear sector.

— What is extremism and how can people become radicalised or violent extremists?
— What are the motivations, intentions and capabilities of violent extremists?
— What can we learn from real life examples?
— What is the role of different stakeholders involved in the identification and mitigation of extremist threats to the nuclear sector?
— What are the main components of a comprehensive insider mitigation programme?
— What are examples of effective measures to help ensure the reliability of personnel accessing nuclear facilities or sensitive information related to the nuclear sector?
— How reliable are background checks and other trustworthiness programmes?
— How can technologies strengthen insider mitigation programmes?

2 http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Le-nucleaire-n-echappe-pas-aux-derives-islamistes-760935
In line with WINS’ innovative approach to Best Practice Workshops, this event will be interactive and professionally facilitated. The workshop will be built around a number of presentations from invited expert speakers and breakout sessions to further explore the topic and to listen to participant experience and lessons learned. Tools and techniques used to mitigate the insider threat will be demonstrated during the workshop.

An instant Electronic Voting system will be used to allow participants to anonymously vote using keypads, providing their views on questions put to the workshop. As with all WINS events, the discussions will be unclassified but subject to Chatham House rules (what was said can be reported, but not attributed).

The workshop will be held in English. Participation will be limited, so please let us know as soon as possible if you wish to attend this event. Attendees will be expected to meet their own costs for travel and accommodation, but all workshop-related costs will be met by the organisers. No registration fee is required!

The workshop will include managers and other senior representatives from nuclear operators, regulatory bodies, law enforcement agencies and international organisations. Vendors and security experts will be invited to demonstrate tools and techniques used to support the implementation of human reliability programmes.

Click here to register. For further information please contact:

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**Venue:**  
Wolke 19. Donau-City-Straße 11,  
1220 Wien  
http://eventwolken.at/de/  
wolke19/#/home
WORKSHOP PRELIMINARY PROGRAMME

DAY 1: TUESDAY
25TH APRIL 2017

Introduction
— Welcoming Remarks and Workshop Objectives
— Participant Introductions, Pre-Workshop Survey and Expectations
— Summary of outcomes from 2014 and 2016 WINS events

Understanding radicalisation and violent extremism, and how it relates to the nuclear industry
— What is the history of modern radicalisation and who are the main groups of concern? What factors drive the radicalisation of individuals?
— What are the known intentions and capabilities of groups promoting radicalisation? What are the most pertinent current and likely future threats?
— How is radicalisation increasingly relevant to the nuclear industry – what are real case involving radicalised individuals in the nuclear and non-nuclear sector and what lessons can be learned from these cases? What features make the nuclear industry more or less vulnerable to becoming a target of HVEs?

Engaging all stakeholders
— What are the objectives and content of an overall mitigation strategy?
— Who are the stakeholders involved in the mitigation process? What is their role and contribution?
— What are the gaps and opportunities for optimising the communication, coordination and cooperation amongst key stakeholders (e.g. the intelligence community, the regulator and the operator)?

Designing and implementing an effective mitigation programme against HVE
— What is the content of an effective mitigation programme?
— What are the main components of an effective human reliability programme?
— What are the specific measures to be taken before, during and after employment to minimise the risk?

Lessons learned and best practices
— What are the lessons learned from selected practitioners? What are the main challenges they are facing? What are the possible solutions?
— What are the best practices for personnel security and national security vetting? How legal and cultural differences impact the vetting processes? What are the most usual challenges faced during the vetting process?
— What can we learn from other sectors, such as aviation, oil and gas, or the chemical industry?

Exploring selected tools and techniques to minimise the risk
— What are behavioural observation tools and techniques?
— What are the usual barriers and challenges for implementing these tools and techniques at facility-level?
— How do we measure the success of the human reliability programmes? How can we ensure their continuous improvement?

The Way Forward
— What are the key findings of the event?
— How applicable are they to participants’ respective context?
— What is a way forward to reduce the threat of HVEs?

DAY 2: WEDNESDAY
26TH APRIL 2017

DAY 3: THURSDAY
27TH APRIL 2017